Civil Law: Torts and Damages

PICART v. SMITH
GR. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

STREET, J.: (Last Clear Chance) The plaintiff was riding on a pony over a Carlatan Bridge at San Fernando, La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at about 10-12 miles per hour. He blew his horn as warning which the plaintiff heard. Having seen the approaching fast-approaching auto, he pulled the pony up against the railing on the right side instead of going left. The bridge is about 75 meters long and 4.8 meters wide. The defendant guided the auto to the left, that being the proper side for the auto, he assumed that the plaintiff would move to the other side. The defendant continued to approach without decreasing the speed. When he had gotten near, there being no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, he then turned the auto to the right to escape hitting the horse. The horse got frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head across the railing. The auto struck on the hock of the left hind leg of the horse which was eventually broken. The horse fell and the plaintiff was thrown off with some violence. The horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. CFI of La Union absolved the defendant from liability.

ISSUE: Was defendant in maneuvering the car was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to the civil obligation to repair the damage done?

HELD: YES. The control of the situation passé entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there was no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. In doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. In view of the known nature of the horse, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with autos, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. The test of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience. Applying the conduct of the defendant we think that negligence is clearly established. It goes without saying that the plaintiff was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under this circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, with reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Judgment is REVERSED.

MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BAKING
GR. No. 156037, May 28, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: (Proximate Cause) Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition.

ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident?

HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

Civil law: Torts and Damages: Notes for Midterms

Quasi-Delict: Definition

Art. 2176: Fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connected or unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation, causes damage to another.

Elcano v. Hill: An act, whether punishable or not punishable by law, whether criminal or not criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent, which result in the damage to another.

Quasi-Delict v. Torts

QD is known as culpa-aquiliana is a civil law concept while Torts is Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is broader than culpa-aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well. However, Article 21 with Art 19 and 20, greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

Quasi-Delict: Scope

Art. 2176 and Elcano v. Hill: covers not only punishable by law, but also criminal in character, whether intentional, voluntary, or negligent.

Presence of pre-existing contract generally bars the applicability of the law on quasi-delict. However, Air France v. Carrascoso and some other cases provides that the mere existence of a contract does not automatically negate the existence of quasi-delict xxx the act that breaks the contract may also be tort. Air France is reiterated in PSBA vs. CA.

Types of Quasi-Delicts:

Intentional Torts: When the law tries to serve its highest purpose; to regulate the relations among men; to promote mutual respect, dignity and justice.

Sea Commercial v. CA: Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrong which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.

Elements of Abuse of Right
1. there is a legal right or duty
2. which is exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Article 19 together with the succeeding articles on human relations was intended to embody certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of their social orders. (Sea Commercial supra)
Strict Liability Torts:

The rule on strict liability is said to be applicable in situations in which social policy requires the defendant make good the harm which results to others from abnormal risks which are inherent in activities that are not considered blameworthy because they are reasonably incident to desirable industrial activities.

Provisions:
1. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost (Art. 2183)
2. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, etc. (Art 2187)
3. RA 7394 or the “Consumer Acts of the Philippines”.
The product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
a. presentation of product
b. use and hazard reasonably expected of it
c. the time it was put into circulation
4. Head of the family that lives in a building is responsible for the damages causes by things thrown or falling from the same ( Art 2193)

Human Dignity

Refer to Jacutin v. People. GR No. 140604, March 6, 2002.

Art. 26 of NCC.

Nuisance

Refer to nuisance in property.

Scope: Public and private
Nature: per se and per accidense

Nuisance is the limitation of the use of property

Bengzon v. Province of Pangasinan: The pumping station should have foreseen the consequences of the construction of such station. The duty shifted to pumping station that they should have thought that the construction may give damage to Bengzons.

Attractive Nuisance: Requisites
1. it must involve children
2. it must have dangerous instrumentality
3. there is a failure to take reasonable precaution

Attractive nuisance is an implied license to enter and a breach of duty.

Quasi-Delict: Person Responsible

Art. 2176: One who directly responsible for the damages is responsible, others are:
1. Father or mother with respect to the damages of their minor child.
2. Guardians with authority to minor child or incapacitated who lives with them
3. Owners and managers of the establishment with respect to employees
4. Employers
5. The State
6. Teachers or heads of establishment of arts and trades with respect to students

Schloendoerff doctrine regards a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an independent contractor, because of his skill the exercises and the lack of control exerted over his work. Under this doctrine, the hospital is exempt from the application of the repondeat superior principle for fault or negligence committed by physician in the discharge of their profession. HOWEVER, Ramos v. CA weakens this doctrine- hospitals are no longer exempt from universal rule of respondeat superior.

Doctrine of Corporate Negligence, hospitals have now the duty to make reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by physicians practicing in its premises.

Doctrine of ostensible agency- imposes liability upon hospital because of the hospitals’ actions as principal or as employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists.

Quasi-Delict: Requisites

Taylor v. Manila Electric Co.:
1. Fault or negligence of the defendant
2. Damage suffered or incurred by plaintiff
3. The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

Traditional Quasi-Delict: Elements

Art. 2176:
1. act or omission
2. damage or injury is caused to another
3. fault or negligence is present
4. no pre-existing contractual obligation
5. causal connection between damage done and act or omission

Quasi-Delict and Crime: Difference

Barredo v. Garcia:
1. Crimes affect public interest, while quasi-delict concerns only private concerns
2. The RPC punishes the criminal act, while NCC, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damages incurred
3. Crimes are not broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them, while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.

Quasi-Delict and Culpa contractual: Difference

Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.: Culpa aquiliana (QD) the culpa is substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie, while culpa contractual, culpa is considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing.

Test of Negligence

Negligence is statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time, and place (Art 1173)

Test: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not he is guilty of negligence. (Roman Law paterfamilias).

CASES

Sea Commercial v. CA- discussion on Art. 19
Afialda v. Hisole- Defense in torts: Assumption of Risk
Jacutin v. People- Human Dignity
Bengzon v. Prov. Of Pangasinan- Nuisance
Taylor v. Manila Electric Co.- Attractive Nuisance
University of the East v. Jader- Art. 19
Uypitching v. Quiamco- Art. 20
Vestil v. IAC- Strict Liability Tort (Art. 2183)
Amonoy v. Gutierrez- Damnum absque injuria (not applied but discussed)
Albenson Enterprise v. CA- Art. 21 (not applied but cited)
Daywalt v. Corporacion- Intentional Tort, Culpable act, wrongful interference of third party in a contract (not applied)
Gilchrist v. Cuddy- Wrongful interference of a third party in a contract (applied), Intentional act
Wylie v. Rarang- Intentional act/ criminal act
Barredo v. Garcia- Independence of civil liability based on NCC from civil liability based on RPC
Elcano v. Hill- Civil action lays even the acquittal in criminal case
Dulay v. CA- Master servant rule
Air France v. Carrascoso- Bad faith, Exception in Art. 2176 as basis for quasi-delict, contractual breach may be subject to torts.
Tenchavez v. Escano- Bad faith
Civil Aeronautics v. CA- Bad faith
Mandarin Villa v. CA- Negligence, test in determining negligence
RCPI v. CA- Negligence
Metropolitan Bank v. CA- Deligence of a good pater familias

Civil Law: Torts and Damages

CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
No. 12191, October 14, 1918

FISHER, J.: (Negligence by employee attributable to employer even in contractual breach) Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to travel by trade to the office located in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on his way home by rail and when the train drew up to the station in San Mateo, he rose from his seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped off from the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to slip off from under him and he fell violently on the platform. He rolled and was drawn under the moving car. He was badly crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized which resulted to amputation of his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against defendant in CFI of Manila founding his action upon the negligence of the employees of defendant in placing the watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having found negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Is the negligence of the employees attributable to their employer whether the negligence is based on contractual obligation or on torts?

HELD: YES. It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence. It is to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage. However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the master from liability fro the latter’s act. The fundamental distinction between obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. When the source of obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is suffient prima facie to warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve the employer from liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune from damages arising from breach of their contracts. Defendant was therefore liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked by defendant is untenable. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act- that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. It is to be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his daily routine. Our conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence and therefore was not guilty of contributory negligence. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED.

Civil Law: Torts and Damages

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 112576, October 26, 1994

ROMERO, J.: (Bank’s Negligence as Source of Liability) Isabel Katigbak, president and owner of 65% shares of Rural Bank of Padre Garcia, Inc., maintains a current accounts with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. MBTC received from Central Bank a credit memo that its demand deposit account was credited with P304k for the account of RBPG, representing loans granted by the CB. On the basis of credit memo, Katigbak issued several checks against its account with MBTC, two of which were payable to Dr. and Mrs. Roque. The checks were deposited with Philippine Banking Corp. however the same bounced when they were forwarded to MBTC. It was twice dishonored. Dr. Roque went to RBPG for the bounced checks. RBPG paid Dr. Roque an amount of P50k representing the checks. Katigbak, who was on vacation in Hongkong with her family, received overseas call from Mrs. Maris Katigbak-San Juan at her residence in Makati that Mr. Dungo, Asst. Cashier of MBTC, berating her about the bounced checks and saying “Nag-issue kayo ng tseke, wala naming pondo”. Mrs. San Juan was instructed by Katigbak to check and verify regarding the credit memo of CB for P304K in favor of RBPG as she was certain that the checks were covered by the credit memo. Mrs. San Juan another insulting phone call from Mr. Dungo (“Bakit kayo nag-iisue ng tseke na wala namang pondo, P300K na”). He also brushed aside the request to check and verify the credit memo, telling her sarcastically that he was very sure that no such credit memo existed. Katigbak had to cut short her vacation and went back home. She then called MBTC and she was able to talk to Mr. Dungo who arrogantly said “Bakit kayo magagalit, wala naman kayog pondo?” This shocked Katigbak which caused her blood pressure to rise to a dangerous level and she had to undergo medical treatment at the Makati Medical Center for two days. MBTC did not only dishonored the check, it also issued four debit memos representing service and penalty charges for the returned checks. Katigbak filed the civil case in RTC Lipa against MBTC for damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of petitioner. The same was affirmed by CA with deletion as to temperate damages, and deduction as to amount of moral damages.

ISSUE: Is there a basis as to negligent act of MBTC as the ground for the awarding of damages in the civil suit of Katigbak?

HELD: YES. The presence of malice and the evidence of besmirched reputation or loss of credit and business standing, as well as a reappraisal of its probative value, involves factual matters which have been determined by the lower court. There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that it should not be considered negligent, much less be held liable for damages on account of inadvertence of its bank employee as Art. 1173 of the Civil Code only requires it to exercise the diligence of a good pater familias. The dishonoring of the respondent’s checks committed through negligence by the petitioner was rectified nine days after receipt of the credit memo. MBTC was remiss in its duty and obligation to treat private respondent account with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. While the bank’s negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages. Insult was added to injury by petitioner bank’s issuance of debit memoranda representing service and penalty charges for the returned checks, not to mention the insulting remarks from its Asst. Cashier. Moral and temperate damages which are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation are not awarded to penalize the petitioner but to compensate the respondents from injuries suffered as a result of the former’s fault and negligence. AFFIRMED.


RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. v. COURT APPEALS
GR. No. 79578, March 13, 1991

SARMIENTO, J.: (Negligence by a party engaged in business affected with public interest) Spouses Minerva and Flores Timan sent a telegram of condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Hilario Midoranda at Trinidad, Calbayog City, through RCPI at Cubao, Quezon City, to convey their deepest sympathy for the death of the mother-in-law of Hilario Midoranda. The condolence telegram was correctly transmitted as far as written text was concerned. However, the condolence message was typewritten on a “Happy Birthday” card and placed inside a “Christmasgram” envelope. It is not surprising that when the telegram reached their cousin, it became the joke of the Midorandas’ friend, relatives, and associates. The incident caused embarrassment and distress to respondent Minerva Timan, she suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting her confinement for three days in Capitol Medical Center in QC. The civil action was then instituted against RCPI for such transmittal was done intentionally and with gross breach of contract resulting to redicule, contempt, and humiliation of the private respondent and the addressees. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Timans spouses. It was affirmed in toto by CA.

ISSUE: Is there a negligence of the part of RCPI to award damages to respondent spouses?

HELD: YES. RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is engaged in a business affected with public interest, As such, it is bound to exercise the degree of diligence expected of it in the performance of its obligation. It is evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. It seems out of this world; therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not render only violence to good taste and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender’s feelings. They ridiculed the deceased’s loved ones and destroy the atmosphere of grief and respect for the departed. It is clear that when RCPI typed the message of condolence in a birthday card and delivered the same in a colorful Christmasgram envelope; it committed a breach of contract as well as gross negligence. Its excuse that it runs out of social condolence card is unacceptable. It bears stress that this botchery exposed not only the petitioner’s gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard for the sentiments of its clientele, which tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must be held liable for damages. Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.


MANDARIN VILLA, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 119850, June 20, 1996

FRANCISCO, J.: (Negligence arising from non-following of POS Guidelines) Atty. Clodualdo de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at petitioner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafiood Village. After dinner the waiter handed him the bill in the amount of P2,658.50. Atty. De Jesus offered to pay through his BANKARD credit card. The card was accepted however after validation the waiter returned and audibly informed Atty. De Jesus that his credit card had expired. Atty. De Jesus replied saying that the same is about to expire on September 1990 as embossed on its face. Atty. De Jesus and his two guests went to cashier to verify again the card. The computer said “CARD EXPIRED”. They then returned to their table. Prof. Lirag, another guest, uttered the following remarks: “ Clody, may problema ba? Baka kailangang maghugas na kame ng pinggan?”. He then left to get his BPI Express Credit card from his car. The same was honored and accepted. After the incident, he instituted the civil suit for damages against BANKARD and petitioner. The trial court ordered the defendants to pay Atty. De Jesus jointly and severally for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The CA modified the decision finding petitioner solely liable for the damages, reduced the monetary award for moral and exemplary damages, and deleting the award for attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent based on the facts and if so, is its negligent act is the proximate cause of the damage suffered by Atty. De Jesus?

HELD: YES. Petitioner cites its good faith in checking, not just once but twice, the validity of the aforementioned card prior its dishonor. It argued that since the computer flashed an information that the credit card expired, petitioner could not be expected to honor the same much less be adjudged negligent for dishonoring it. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Point of Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow must follow under the circumstances provides: CARD EXPIRED 1. check expiry date on card, 2. if unexpired, refer to CB, 2.1 if valid, honor up to maximum of SPL only, 2.2 if in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e. 2.3 if in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor the card, 3. if expired, do not honor the card. Cleary, it has not yet expired in October 1989, when the same was wrongfully dishonored. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such petitioner is guilty of negligence. The humiliation and embarrassment of the private respondent was brought about not by such remark of Prof. Lirag but by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of credit card. The remark of Prof. Lirag served only to aggravate the embarrassment then felt by Atty. De Jesus albeit silently within himself. The appeal is DISMISSED.

Civil Law: Law on Property and Lease

GR. No. L- 32917, July 18, 1988 Julian Yap vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, etc. and Goulds Pumps Int’l Phil., Inc.

Case: This is a collection suit instituted by Goulds Pumps against Spouses Yap.
Facts: Yap bought from Goulds Pumps a water pump. The water pump was the installed in his premises. Upon failure to pay the installment, Goulds instituted the case.
RTC: Judge Tañada rendered judgment in favor of Goulds. A writ of execution was released and the same pump was levied by the sheriff. Yap appealed the judgment to SC.
Issue: Whether of not the pump is immovable as contested by petitioner Yap such that the judgment of Judge Tañada be invalidated for not following the procedure in levying a real property.
SC: The water pump installed in movable property. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners. DENIED.

GR. No. L-20329, March 16, 1923 Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Joaquin Jaramillo

Case: This is an action for mandamus filed by Standard Oil against Jaramillo, register of deed in the City of Manila, to compel the latter to register a chattel mortgage.
Facts: Gervasia was a lessor in a land and the owner of a house built thereon. She then conveyed the interest over lease and the house by way of chattel mortgage to Standard Oil. Standard went to the Registrar of Deeds in Manila to register such conveyance. Jaramillo refused to register such mortgage saying that the same cannot be registered as chattel as the property in question does not fall under the meaning of movable properties to be a subject of a chattel mortgage, hence this case.
SC: It is his duty to accept the proper fee and place the instrument on record. The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage.

GR. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 Jose Burgos Sr., Jose Burgos, Jr., Bayani Soriano, and J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. vs. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Case: This is a petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Burgos against the respondent.
Facts: The case is filed to invalidate the search warrant issued by the respondent as well as the admissibility to the evidence the properties seized from the premises of petitioner. A search warrant was issued to search the addresses of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”. Several machineries, equipment, paraphernalia, and several documents were seized. One of the grounds to invalidate the search warrant was the seizure of articles belonging to co-petitioner Burgos Sr. where the search was only directed to Burgos Jr. Another ground set forth to invalidate the search warrant is the contention of petitioner that the properties seized were real properties.
SC: Section 2 Rule 126 of RoC does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. Ownership is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

GR. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962 Mindanao Bus Co. vs. The City Assessor and Treasurer and Board of Tax Appeal Cagayan De Oro City

Case: This is a case questioning the assessment by respondent on the property of petitioner considering those as real properties.
Facts: The city of assessor of CDO collected from Mindanao Bus Co. a realty tax from the repair and maintenance of its welder machines, storm boring machine, lathe machine with motor, grinder, hydraulic press, baterry charger. These machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipments to produce finish products for sale, nor to repair machineries.
CTA: Sustained the collection of tax.
Issue: whether or not the properties in question can be subject to real property tax.
SC: Respondent said that the properties were immobilized citing Art. 415 of the NCC. So that a movable property is to be immobilized must first be “essential and principal element” of an industry or work without which such industry or work would be “unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it is established.
The tools and equipment in question is not essential and principal elements of petitioner’s business of transporting passengers nad cargoers by motor trucks. They are merely incidental- to repair or service the transportation business. They are not real property, hence not subject to real property tax.

Remedial Law: Criminal Procedure: Arrest

Manangan v. CFI
- Petitioner counsel for himself was charged in CFI with violation of RPC (Execution of Deeds by Intimidation). On the same date an order of arrest was released.
- He then filed a petition for CPM with TRO assailing the jurisdiction of the lower court. However the same was dismissed for non-payment of legal fees.
- During prelim invest. he did not show up and disappeared for 1 year.
- When he surfaced an alias writ was issued. And he challenged this Alias Writ. He contested the Alias writ in CFI but the latter said that the said warrant of arrest was still in force after the lapsed of time.
SC: Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.

People v. Ayangao
- Policemen received an information that a woman would be traveling with marijuana from Maountain Province to Pampanga.
- The informant went with them in the place pointed and he personally identified the woman. They approached the woman. The policemen noticed a protruding marijuana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes.
- The policemen identified themselves and asked the woman to put out the contents of the sack. The sack contains sweet potato with a bricklike substance packed with a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen it was identified to be marijuana. She was arrested and was convicted in the trial court.
- She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since the warrantless search is invalid, not having been pursuant to lawful arrest.
SC: The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested — transporting marijuana, are act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender.
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant’s arrival was not known by the informant. AFFIRMED.

People v. Aminudin (Inadmissible Evidence; Invalid Search)
- Aminudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from a ship. His bag was inspected which contained marijuana.
- The prosecution had earlier an information that a marijuana would be transported in Iloilo. Acting on the tip, they waited till evening when the ship embarked. They informant pointed on Aminudin followed by the arrest and search.
- Aminudin disclaimed of the marijuana. He also invoked that he was arbitrary arrested and was searched without warrant. He was convicted by the trial court.
- In this court he pleaded to reverse the ruling on the ground that the evidence against him was inadmissible.
SC: Tip they received from the informant was alleged to be 2 days prior the arrest. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. This is not inflagrante delicto. ACQUITTED.

People v. Tangliben
- Policemen were having surveillance within the Victory Liner premises. During that time, they saw someone (Tangliben) carrying a bag who is acting suspiciously. He was approached and asked for the content of the bag. The accused refuses at first but when the policemen identified themselves he acceded. The bag contained marijuana.
- The trial court convicted him of violation of RA 6425. The defense set up was that the evidence presented should be inadmissible for having it obtained unlawfully without warrant.
SC: One of the exception in the general rule requiring search warrant is search incidental to a lawful arrest. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. In contrast with Aminudin, this instance presents urgency. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. AFFIRMED.

People v. Montilla
- Montilla was apprehended by two policemen upon the information of an informant that the former would be carrying a bag of marijuana. He was apprehended in a waiting shed.
- He contends that the marijuana was a product of unlawful warrantless search therefore inadmissible; that the officers had the opportunity to procure search warrant.
SC: Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk" measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
What happened is that when the authorities approached Montilla and ask to open the bag he voluntarily did.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. AFFIRMED.

People v. Malmsteadf
- A checkpoint was set up in the area after an information was came to the knowledge of authorities that a Caucasian will be traveling with prohibited drugs from Sagada.
- The bus Malmsteadf was reading was stopped informing that they would conduct an inspection. Accused was the sole Caucasian in the bus.
- One of them saw a bulge in Malmsteadf pocket. They asked for his passport. When he failed to such, he was required to have the bulge taken out which turned out to be a hashish. Also found was a teddybear with hashish and a bag.
- During the trial he pleaded not guilty and invoked the illegality of the search. The trial court found him guilty under RA 6425.
- He is now invoking that the evidence obtained were inadmissible for having obtained illegally.
SC: The search was pursuant to a lawful arrest. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. There was a probable cause on the part of the arresting officer that a crime is actually committing. There the was a suspicion since an information of such crime is already relied and from the fact that he was not able to present his passport would make the authorities conclude of such crime. AFFIRMED.

People v. Lo Ho Wing
- Lo and another one was charged under Dangerous Drugs Act for transporting shabu. The trial court convicted them.
- The facts are the accused were from China and on their way home, they were apprehended by authorities and were to be searched. The authorities found shabu inside the tin cans which are supposed to contain tea. The trial court in convicting them said that the search and seizure was valid.
SC: The appellant contends that the authorities could have procured a warrant search. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused. , We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the appellee's brief, that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. AFFIRMED.

Manalili v. CA
- The Anti-Narcotic Unit was having a surveillance upon the information that drug addicts were roaming around the Kaloocan cemetery. When they lighted their car they chanced upon a person (manalili) high on drugs; he has reddish eyes, and to be walking in swaying manner. When he was approached, he was asked what he was holding. He resisted but gave up. The authorities asked what’s inside the wallet which found to be a residue of marijuana.
- He was brought to the Unit.
- The appellant proposed a different version of the arrest. The trial court convicted Manalili. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: The appellant contests the admissibility of the evidence presented since it is a by-product of illegal search. The SC said that such was akin to stop-and-frisk searched. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. The evidence presented was admissible since it was obtained after a valid warrantless arrest. DENIED.

Ilagan v. Enrile
- Ilagan was arrested based on the mission order issued by Defense Minister Enrile.
- One of the visiting lawyers was also arrested. Therefore this petition for habeas corpus was filed. They contend that the arrest is violative of right; such that it cannot be made by Mission Order. Respondent said that the habeas corpus is suspended and the arrest was made thru PDA issued by the President.
- During the hearing they were granted a release order however even the following day, they were still in the custody of the authorities. They filed an urgent motion however such was opposed by respondent saying that the crime of rebellion has already been filed against them and a warrant of arrest is now to be served.
- They contend before this court that the suspension of habeas corpus is unconstitutional since it is violative of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
SC: In case of illegal arrest or lack of preliminary investigation, the remedy is not habeas corpus but motion to quash the warrant arrest, or ask for preliminary investigation.
The question as to where among the three in Sec 5 Rule 113 the arrest was made is within the determination of the trial court.
The Court pronounces that since there is already a charge against them with rebellion in the RTC and an arrest warrant is available, the petition for habeas corpus is moot and academic.

Umil v. Ramos
- This is a consolidated motion for reconsideration filed by different petitioners assailing the order of the Court holding the validity of their arrest without warrant.
- They are contending that they were illegally imprisoned. The SC in determining if there is illegal detention, looked at the validity of the arrest.
SC: Contention without merit. Dural (Dural Case) was arrested because he is a member of the NPA. The crime is a continuing one. He was identified to have shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in a patrol car. The arrest made to Umil was anchored in Sec 5 b. of Rule 113 (Hot pusuit arrest) because he just committed the offense and the arresting officer has the personal knowledge of the crime committed.
In Umil case, the arrest is considered pursuant to Sec 5 a and b of Rule 113. the confidential information that the hospital management had furnished the law authorities is sufficient ground for the arrest of a NPA who had an encounter with the law enforcers.
In other cases, the arrest is legal after they were searched pursuant to a search warrant and was found to possess illegal firearms therefore they were caught in flagrante delicto.
In Espiritu case, he was arrested upon the information of the arresting officer based from reliable sources that he uttered word inciting to sedition during a press lunch.
In Nazareno case, the Court upheld the validity of the arrest without warrant even though the arrest was made 14 days after the commission of the crime. It is held that the arrest is valid since it was only after 14 days that the arresting officer came to have knowledge that there is probable cause of the offense committed by Nazareno. DENIED.

13th Case

Civil Law: Law on Sales

David vs. Tiongson

A complaint for specific performance was lodge in RTC against Sp. Tiongson and Sps. Ventura and David, and Florencia Vda. De Basco as complainants. The complaint alleged that they bought a parcel of land from the respondents with an agreement that the latter shall execute the necessary deed of sale after full payment of the purchase price. In the trial court, the defendants were in default hence the judgment was in favor of complainant. However, when elevated, the CA reversed the ruling for Sp. David and Florencia Vda. De Basco. The CA affirmed the ruling in the case of Sp. Ventura. It was alleged by Tiongson that the complainants had actually not paid the full amount and they were in arrears. The CA said that there was no perfected contract of sale with Sp. David and Florencia Basco. DAVID- CA said there was a conflicting claim as to the agreed price hence no meeting of the minds. BASCO- the lot sold could not be specifically determined or identified by the parties.
SC: DAVID- We disagree. The question to be determined should not be whether there was an agreed price, but what that agreed price was, whether for a total of 15k as claimed by the Davids or 120 per sq.meter as alleged by Tiongson. The seller could not render invalid a perfected contract of sale by merely contradicting the buyers’ allegation regarding the price, and subsequently raising the lack of agreement as to the price. It is the fact that Davids had religiously paying the price for a total of 15050.
BASCO- We disagree. We find that the 109sq.m. lot was adequately described in the receipt, or at least can be easily determinable. The receipt issued on June 4, 1983 stated that the lot being purchased by Florencia was one earlier earmarked for her sister. Any mistake in the designation of the lots does not vitiate the consent of the parties or effect the validity and binding effect of the contract of sale. Ruling is REVERSED.

Civil Law: Torts and Damages

Art. 694 A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or any thing else which:
1. injures or endangers the health or safety of others;or
2. annoys or offends the senses; or
3. shocks, defies or disregard decency or morality; or
4. obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
5. hinders or impairs the use of property

Nuisance: Lt. nocumentum or Fr. nuire (to harm, hurt, or injure)

Easement Against Nuisance

Art. 682 Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing any nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water, glare, and other causes.

Who is the servient in an easement against nuisance?
Ans: The proprietor or possessor of the building or property, who commits the nuisance. The property or the land itself is the servient estate.

Who is the dominant in an easement against nuisance?
Ans: The general public, or anybody injured by the nuisance.

What are the rights of dominant estate?
Ans: If public nuisance:
a. prosecution under RPC or any local ordinance
b. a civil action
c. abatement, without judicial proceedings
If private nuisance:
a. civil action
b. abatement without judicial proceedings

While a true easement prohibits the owner from that which he could lawfully do where it not for the existence of the easement, a nuisance is something that is done or allowed unlawfully, whether or not a person has made a notarial prohibition.

Art. 683 Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may be maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.

Art. 2191 Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
a. by the explosion of the machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
b. by excessive smoke, which may be harmful to property to persons or property;
c. by the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
d. by emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.

Types of nuisance: accdg. Civil Code
Public (common)- affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons (although the extent of annoyance, danger, or damage be unequal) Criminal proceeding may be used for abatement
- noisy of dangerous factory in a residential district

Private – that which is not public. Criminal proceeding is not a remedy.
- an illegally constructed dam partially resting on another’s estate.

Accdg. to manner of relief
1. those abatable by criminal and civil action
2. those abatable by only civil actions
3. those abatable judicially
4. those abatable extrajudicially

Case no. Six to Twelve

Civil Law: Law on Sales

FilOil Marketing vs. IAC

Pabalan sold a parcel of land to Villa Rey Transit. On the day of the sale, the TCT was delivered by Pabalan to Villarama, president of Villa Rey, who caused the issuance of the new title in his own name. The transfer appeared to be a deed of sale.

On the same day Villarama mortgaged the lot in behalf of Villa Rey to FilOil as security for a loan. Having defaulted the payment, the lot was extrajudicially foreclosed in which FilOil won the bidding. However before FilOil could consolidate the ownership, Pabalan filed a complaint against Villarama, Villa Rey and FilOil.

The complaint alleged that the sale was conditional and did not transfer the title to the buyer until full payment of the price. RTC and CA both rendered a judgment in favor of complainant.

SC: It is obvious that the instrument is not a contract to sell as contended by Pabalan. It is a deed of sale in which the title was transferred to the vendee as of the date of the transaction notwithstanding that the purchase price had not been fully paid at that time.
In stipulation, it is recognized that the vendee may sell the property prior to full payment of all the amount.

Villarama acted in bad faith when he secured the cancellation of vendor’s title and replaced it in his own name. Pabalan left the drafting of the deed of sale to Villarama whom she trusted. This circumstance alone imposed to Villarama the moral if not the legal responsibility to explain the meaning and consequence of the contract she was signing.

FilOil also acted in bad faith in accepting the property as security to the loan without exercising more vigilance in inquiring with Pabalan, as lessor, into the antecedent of the transfer of title to Villarama.


Servicewide Specialist vs. IAC

Siton purchased from Car Traders Phil. a Mitsubishi Celeste. He paid the 25T downpayment and executed a PN expressly stipulating that the remaining obligation shall be payable without the need of notice of demand. He also executed a chattel mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Car Trader.

The PN and credit was first assigned by Car Trader in favor of Filinvest Credit Corp. which the latter assigned the same to Servicewide Specialist. Siton was advised of the reassignment.

Alleging Siton failed to pay the installment , Servicewide instituted the present action against Siton and John Doe. De Dumo appeared as John Doe alleging that he purchased the vehicle to Siton. He averred that he was the one who continued the payment of installment. The trial court ordered Siton and de Dumo to pay jointly and severally the remaining balance. CA affirmed the ruling.

SC: Servicewide alleged that the sale between Siton and De Dumo was void as contrary to the provision of Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The Rule is that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however he is alleged under pain of penal liability to secure the written consent of the mortgagee.

We find it correct in holding that Siton and De Dumo is jointly and severally liable to the obligation as there was no implication that the liability of Siton is extinguished when the time he sold the property to De Dumo. The same does not constitute novation.

The acceptance of payment from De Dumo merely results the addition of debtors and not novation.


Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals

Filriters is the registered owner of a Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness. Under a Deed of Assignment Filriters transferred the CBCI to PhilFinance. Subsequently PhilFinance transferred the CBCI to TRB while the same was still in the name of Filriters. The transfer was made under a repurchase agreement granting PhilFinance the right to repurchase the instrument note. When PhilFinance failed to buy back the note on maturity date, it executed a deed of assignment to TRB all its rights and title.

TRB sought the transfer and registration of CBCI in its name however CB refused to effect the transfer in view of the action filed by Filriters.

Trial court and CA nullified the transfer made between PhilFinance to TRB.

SC: The assignment of certificate from Filriters to PhilFinance was fictitious, having made without consideration and did not conform to bank circular which provides that any assignment of registered certificates shall not be valid unless made by the registered owner thereof in person or by his representative duly authorized in writing.
TRB interest has no basis, since it was derived from PhilFinance, whose interest was inexistent. What happened is that PhilFinance merely borrowed CBCI from Filriters, a sister corporation, to guarantee its financing operations. Therefore the transfer of certificate from PhilFinance to TRB is complete nullity.


Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie

A property of the Intestate Estate of Reynoso was leased to Bonnevie by the administratrix for a period of 1 year with stipulation that if ever the property shall be sold, the lessees shall be given a first priority to purchase the same, all things and consideration being equal.

According to administratrix she notified Bonnevie by registered mail that she was selling the property however Bonnevie never replied to the notice. The same was offered and sold to petitioner. The administratrix send a letter to Bonnevie to vacate the premises but the latter refused.

An action for ejectment was filed which resulted to a compromise agreement; Bonnevie shall vacate the premises. Bonnevie did not comply hence a motion for execution was filed. While the case was pending, Bonnevie filed an action to annul the contract of sale to Guzman and the cancellation of the title. Bonnevie asked the court to require the seller to sell the property to him under the same terms and condition.

The ejectment case was dismissed and when it was appealed the same was consolidated with the other civil case of annulment of sale. CFI rendered a judgment in favor of Bonnevie. It was affirmed by CA.

SC: There was no satisfactory proof that the letter was sent to Bonnevie; that administratrix never showed the registry return card.

Even if the letter had been sent to and received by Bonnevie and they did not exercise their right of first priority, the administrator would still be guilty of violating the contract of lease which stated that Bonnevie could exercise, ‘all things and conditions being equal’.

The fact that Bonnevie had financial problems at that time was no justification for denying them the first option to buy the property. And even Bonnevie could not buy the property, the administrator could not sell the property to another for a lower price and under more favorable terms and conditions.

Guzman & Co. could not be deemed a purchaser in good faith for the record shows that it categorically admitted it was aware of the lease in favor of Bonnevie, who were actually occupying the property.

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice or claim of the interest of some other person in property.

Petition is DENIED.


Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

NDC, during 60s, leased its property in Sta. Mesa to Firestone for ten years renewable for another 10 years with the same conditions. The contract was renewed several times and the latest of which contains stipulation that should the lessor decides to sell the property, priority should be given to the lessee.

When the contract was about to expire Firestone expressed its desire to renew the contract. NDC promised for the renewal. Firestone’s predicament worsen when rumors of NDC’s supposed plan to dispose the property in favor of PUP came to its knowledge. Firestone sent notice to NDC conveying its desire to purchase the property in exercise of its contractual right of first refusal.

Firestone filed an action for specific performance to compel NDC to sell the leased premises. It averred it is pre-empting the sale of the property to PUP. PUP intervened.

The trial court ordered the sale of the property to Firestone. It was affirmed by CA.

SC: It is elementary that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal that stands upon valuable consideration.

A contract of sale is a contract where one of the parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing to the other who shall pay therefore a sum certain in money or its equivalent.

The inherent weakness of the NDC’s proposition that there was no sale as it was only government which was involved in the transaction. A GOCC has a personality of its own distict and separate from the government.

The right of first refusal is an integral and indivisible part of the contract of lease and is inseparable to the whole contract. The consideration for the rightis built into the reciprocal obligations of the parties. Thus it is not correct for the petitioner to insist that there wasno consideration paid by Firestone to be entitled of such right.

Petition is DENIED.


Rosencor Development Corporation vs. Inquing

Respondents were lessees since 1971 of a property owned by Tiangco. The agreement was made orally with stipulation that the lessees were given the right to purchase the property if they decide to sell the same.

Upon the death of Tiangco, the heirs took over the property and the lease contract continued with the same stipulation. Respondents made improvements on the property which were not deducted to rents.

A certain Atty. Aguila sent a notice to vacate the premises addressed to respondents but the latter refused. Thereafter the heir offered to sell the property to respondents for 2M, however the latter offered to buy the same for only 1M.

Later on, respondents again received a letter from Atty. Aguila that the property was already sold to Rosencor. It was further known that the price was only for 726000. Respondent offered to reimburse the selling price but the same was refused. Respondents filed the instant action for rescission of the Deed of Sale between heirs (De Leon) and Rosencor.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. It said that the right to redemption was made orally therefore unenforceable. The CA reversed the ruling.

SC: Is the right of first refusal covered by the Statute of Fraud? The term is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The statute does not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.

The right of first refusal is not among the listed as unenforceable under the statutes of frauds. As such a right of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable and may be proven by oral evidence.

We agree with the CA that the respondents have sufficiently proven the existence of first refusal. It must also be noted that the petitioner did not present evidence to contradict such existence during trial.

May a contract of sale entered into in violation of third party’s right of first refusal be rescinded in order that such third party can exercise said right? In the prevailing doctrine, the contract of sale entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible. There is however, a circumstance which prevents the application of this doctrine in the case at bench. The vendees in this case have proven that it had acted in bad faith for the doctrine to be applicable.

This Court did not find that Rosencor acted in bad faith in the purchase of the property. CA decision is REVERSED.


State Investment House vs. Court of Appeals

Solid Homes entered in a Contract to Sell with Oreta involving a parcel of land in Capitol Park Subd. Solid Homes executed several real estate mortgage contracts in favor of State Investment Homes over its subdivided parcels of land including the property sold to Oreta..

Upon failure to pay, State Investment extrajudicially foreclosed the property including the disputed title.

Oreta filed a complaint before the HLURB against State and Solid Homes for failure of Solid Homes to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale. The Office of Legal, Adjudication and Legal Affairs rendered a decision in favor of Oreta ordering the delivery of title to the latter. HLURB affirmed the ruling.

When it was brought up to SC, the latter referred the case to CA which decided affirming the decision.

SC: We note that herein petitioner admits the superior rights of respondent over the subject property as it did not pray for the nullification of the contract between Solid and Oreta, but instead asked the payment of the release value of the property in question. And even if we were to pass upon the first assigned error, we find the respondent court’s ruling on the matter to be well founded. State’s registered mortgaged right over the property is inferior to that of Oreta’s unregistered right.

The unrecorded sale between Solid and Oreta is preferred for the reason that if the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it again. The decision is AFFIRMED.

First Five Case Digests

Civil Law: Law on Sales

Dignos vs. Court of Appeals

Dignos owned a lot which was sold to Jabil on June 1965 payable in two installment with an assumption of indebtedness with First Insular Bank in the sum of 12000 which was paid to Digno and the next installment to be payed on September of the same year.

On November 1965, Dignos sold the same property to Cabigas. A deed of sale was executed and registered with the Register of Deed.

As Dignos refused the payment of second installment from Jabil, and after the knowledge by the latter of the sale to Cabigas, Jabil filed the instant case.

CFI Cebu rendered a decision voiding the sale of Dignos to Cabigas and awarding the sale to Jabil. CA affirmed the decision.

SC: Dignos reiterated that the sale is conditional and not absolute, such the same is subject to suspensive condition of payment in two installment.

A sale is absolute although denominated as contract of conditional sale where no where in the contract is a stipulation to effect that the title of the property is reserved to vendor until full payment, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon non-fulfillment of obligation. The present case presents the same situation.

Valid elements of the contract of sale: 1. consent or meetings of the mind, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money or its equivalent.

Dignos claimed that when they sold the property to Cabigas the previous contract has been already rescinded. It is undisputed that Dignos never notified Jabil of the rescission nor they filed in court an action to rescind such. SC AFFIRMED in toto the CA decision.


Nool vs. Court of Appeals

Conchita Nool owned a lot which was mortgaged to DBP when she secured a loan. Upon non-payment of loan it was foreclosed by DBP. Within the time of redemption Conchita contacted Anacleto Nool to redeem the foreclosed property which the latter did. The titles were transferred to Anacleto but it was agreed that Conchita can get back the property soon when she has money. Conchita asked the Anacleto for the return of the property but the latter refused even after the intervention of the barangay. The case was filed.

Anacleto theorized that the lands were acquired by them from DBP through negotiated sale. He argued that he was made to believe that the property was still owned by Conchita when they agreed of redemption.

RTC said it was DBP who was the owner of the property when the sale to Anacleto was made. DBP became the absolute owner of the property after the redemption period of the foreclosed property had lapsed. RTC denied the action by Conchita. It was affirmed by CA.

SC: The contract of repurchase entered by Conchita and Anacleto was void there being no subject to speak of. It is clear that Conchita was no longer the owner of the property when such agreement was made with Anacleto. It is likewise clear that the seller can no longer deliver the object of the sale to the buyer, as the buyer had already acquired the title from the rightful owner. Jurisprudence teaches us that a person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell ; the buyer can acquire no more that what the seller can legally transfer.

The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. CA is decision AFFIRMED. Petition is DENIED.

People’s Homesite vs. Court of Appeals

People’s Homesite (PHHC) passéd a resolution subject to the approval of the city council of the Lot 4 as it is hereby awarded to Mendoza. The city council disapproved the proposal. The Mendozas were notified through registered mail. Another subdivision plan was passed and was approved by the city council. PHHC passed a resolution recalling all awards to persons who failed to pay the agreed downpayment. Mendoza never paid the down payment. The questioned award of lot was withdrawn and was re-awarded to other 5 persons. Mendoza asked for reconsideration but before it was acted, He instituted the action.

Trial court sustained the withdrawal while the CA reversed the decision.

SC: There was no perfect sale of Lot 4 to Mendoza. It was conditionally awarded to Mendoza subject to city council’s approval which was disapproved. When after the city council approved such, Mendoza should have manifested his intention over the said award but he did not so.

The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the mind upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. In conditional obligation, the acquisition of rkights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitute the condition. In this case, there was no meeting of the minds.


Heirs of Juan San Andres vs. Rodriguez

Juan San Andres sold a portion of his property to Rodriguez as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Upon his death Ramon San Andres was appointed as administrator of the property. He hired a land surveyor and found that Rodriguez enlarged the property he bought from late Juan. Ramon demanded form the Rodriguez to vacate the portion allegedly occupied but the latter refused hence the present action.

Rodriguez said that the excess portion was also sold to him by late Juan the following day after the first sale. He argued that the full payment of the whole sold lot would be effected within five years from the execution of the formal deed of sale after a survey of the property is conducted, as evidenced by a receipt of sale. The balance of the purchase price was consigned.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner while CA reversed the ruling. In SC petitioner argued that there is no certain object of the contract of sale as the lot was not described with sufficiency that there should be another contract to finally ascertain the identity.

SC: Petition has no merit. The contract of sale has the following elements: 1. consent or meeting of the minds, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money.

There is no dispute that Rodriguez purchased a potion of Lot 1914-B consisting of 345 square meters. The said portion is located at the middle of the lot. Since the lot subsequently sold is said to adjoined the previously paid lot, the subject is capable of being determined without the need of another contract.

However, there is a need to clarify what CA said is a conditional sale. CA considered as a condition the stipulation of the parties that the full consideration, based on a survey of the lot, would be due and payable within 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale.

It is evident in the stipulation in the receipt that the vendor late Juan sold the lot to Rodriguez and undertook the transfer of ownership without any qualification, reservation or condition.

In can be gainsaid from the facts that the contract of sale is absolute, and not conditional. There is no reservation of ownership nor stipulation providing for a unilateral rescission by either party. In fact the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to Rodriguez. Art.1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive deliver thereof.
The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale is not a condition which affects the efficacy of contract.
CA decision is AFFIIRMED.


Galang vs. Court of Appeals

Buenaventuras sold to Galangs the property they inherited from their parents. The agreement was embodied in the Deed of Sale. The agreements as to payment were as follows: 25% of the purchase price is to be paid upon the signing, 25% within 3 months or upon the removal of encargo from the premises, with the delivery of the owner’s duplicate certificate, 50% is within 1 year upon which the title will be transferred. Galangs paid the first 25% of the price. Thereafter they demanded the removal of the encargo and the delivery of the duplicate title. Buenaventuras failed to do so despite the willingness of Galangs to pay the other 25%. Galangs filed the instant action for specific performance.

The trial court rescinded the contract despite the prayer of Galang for specific performance. It ruled that impossible condition, those contrary to good custom or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. Since the consummation of sale is dependent upon the ouster of agricultural lessees which cannot be done because it is against good custom, public policy and the law, the sale is a nullity. CA affirmed the ruling.

SC: We disagree with the conclusion of the two lower courts. Reviewing the terms of the Deed of Sale, it is clear that the parties had reached the stage of perfection of the contract of sale.

The alleged condition precedent, the removal of the encargo, was simply an alternative for payment of another 25% of the purchase price given by the seller. Assuming that the removal of encargo could not be brought about by the buyer, petitioner could have demanded the duplicate of the owners certificate of title by paying 25% of the sale price within 3 months.

The case before us could have been resolved by the lower court without ruling on the whether the encargo was a tenant or not. Granting that it was necessary to rule on the status of the encargo, we find that the courts had been quite precipitate in holding that the encargi was a tenant. Petition is GRANTED.

Remedial Law: Civil Procedure: Rule 1-7

CIVIL PROCEDURE Reviewer

RULE 1

PD 946- Rules of Court not applicable to agrarian cases, even in suppletory character.

Civil Action- is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or for the prevention or redress of wrong. (sec 3a par1)

Rule of Court Not Applicable to:
election cases
cadastral
naturalization
insolvency proceedings
other as provided except by analogy or in a suppletory

The court acquires jurisdiction over cases upon full payment of such prescribed docket fee. Any defect resulting to underpayment of docket fee cannot be cured by amendment (Manchester vs. CA), except (Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion)
when the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within the reasonable time but not beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
the same rules applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims, and other similar pleadings.
when the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of appropriate pleading and filing of prescribed docket fee but subsequently the judgment award not specified in pleadings, or if specified the same has been left for the determination by the court, filing fee shall constitute a lien which shall be enforced and the additional fee assessed and collected by the clerk of court.

When the action involves accion publiciana and related claims for damages, legal fees shall be assessed on both the value of the property and damages sought. The court acquires jurisdiction upon filing of docket fee even though the related damages sought is unspecified.

Unless provided by law or required by public interest, before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all remedies of administrative character should be first exhausted except:
the issue is purely legal one, and nothing of administrative nature is to be and can be done
insistence on its observance would result to nullification of the claim being asserted
the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without or in excess of jurisdiction
respondent is a department secretary
there is a indication of urgency of judicial intervention
the rule does not provide an speedy and adequate remedy
there is a violation of due process
there is estoppel on the part of administrative agency.
there is irreparable injury
to require administrative exhaustion would be unreasonable
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding
the issue on administrative exhaustion has been rendered moot

The court has the power to suspend the rules whenever the end of justice requires. Justification for the court to restrict adherence to procedure in
in matters of life, liberty, honor or property
counsel’s negligence without any participatory negligence of the client
the existence of compelling or special circumstances
the evident merits of the case
a cause entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely prevolous and dilatory
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby


Rule 2

Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. (sec1)

Cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. (sec2)

A single act or omission, there is single cause of action regardless of the number of rights violated.

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of single cause of action, the filing of one (litis pendencia) or judgment (res judicata) is a ground for dismissal of another.

Where the contract is to be performed periodically, as by installment, each failure to pay constitutes a cause of action and can be subject to separate suits or it can be included thru supplemental complaint. However upon complaint, there were several due installments, it is now subject to a single suit. (Larena vs. Villanueva)

Non-payment of a mortgage loan cannot be split by one for payment of the loan, and the other for forclosure, as it will constitute splitting of action.

A party in one pleading may assert s many causes of action against a party provided:
the party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder parties.
the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules
where the causes of action pertains to different venues or jurisdiction, RTC may allow provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court.
where the claims in all causes of action are principally for the recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction

Mis joinder of action is not a ground for dismissal of the action. It is on the motion of another party, be severed and be proceeded separately.

Rule 3

Only natural or juridical person, or entities authorized by law may be parties to civil actions (sec1)

Plaintiff- claiming party, counter-claimant, cross-claimant, third-party plaintiff.
Defendant- original defending party, defendant in a counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party defendant.

Estate of the deceased is authorized by law to be party in a case, labor union, Roman Catholic church, corporation.

An entity not registered may be sued to disclose its members, but cannot sue.

Real parties- who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to avails of the suit.

An action brought not in the name of a party of real interest is a subject for dismissal on the ground of no cause of action.

Parties in interest:
indispensable party- those without whom no final determination can be had of an action
necessary party- those who are not indispensable party but ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for complete determination or settlement of the claim
representative party-those allowed to be prosecuted or defended or someone acting on a fiduciary capacity. Ex. A guardian, executor, administrator
pro-forma party- those who are required to be joined. Ex. Spouses
Quasi-party- those in whose behalf a class or representative suit is brought

Permissive joinder of action requires that:
the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transaction
there is a question of law or fact common to all plaintiff or defendants
such joinder in not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the rules on jurisdiction and venue.

In the case of indispensable parties, the action cannot proceed unless all are joined. If an indispensable party is not impleaded, any judgment would have no effectiveness.

Necessary party may not be impleaded provided there is a reason for such non-inclusion. The court, if unmeritorious, may order the inclusion of necessary party to the suit. Non-inclusion of a necessary party is a waiver of a claim against such party.

Mis-joinder or non-joinder of a party is not a ground for dismissal. They may be dropped or be added upon motion of another party or on the courts initiative.

Class suit- whenever the subject matter is one of common or general interest to many people so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interest of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefits of all. (Tax payer’s suit and stockholders derivative suit)

Alternative defendants- where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several defendants he is entitled to relief, he may joined any or all of them in the alternative, although the relief against one may be inconsistent with the relief against the other.

Death of party: the counsel should inform the court in 30 days after death of such death. Heirs may be allowed to substitute without requiring appointment of executor or administrator; the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall require the representatives to appear in 30 days after notice. Upon failure to appear, the court may order the opposing party to procure an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. (sec16)

Actions that survives:
action to recover real and personal property against the estate
actions to enforce liens thereon
actions to recover for an injury to person or property by reason of tort or delict committed by the deceased

Actions instituted by public officers shall only survive if the successor maintains or continues such suit.

Actions on contractual money claims survive even upon death of a party during the pendency of the action. Favorable judgment shall be part of the estate of the deceased.

An indigent party is exempted from payment of docket fee and other lawful fees, and transcripts of stenographic notes. The amount of the docket fee which the indigent is exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
An adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before the judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should find that the indigent is in fact is a person of sufficient income or property, the proper docket fee shall be assessed and be collected by the clerk of court. (pauper litigant or in forma pauperis)(sec21)


Rule 4

Real actions- actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein shall be commenced and tried with proper court with jurisdiction over the area where the property or part of it is situated. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be subject to MTC exclusive an original jurisdiction where the property is situated.

Personal action- all other actions shall be instituted where the plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides at the plaintiff’s election.

Real Action:
annulment or recession of sale and the return pf realty
to compel the vendor to accept payment of the purchase price of the land
to compel the vendor to deliver the certificate of title to the land
action by the land owner against the subdivision developer for the recession and termination of their contract and the return to the plaintiff of all the documents and titles, with damages by reason of defendant’s contractual breach, since the relief sought is necessary entail the recovery of possession land

Personal action:
action to recover the purchase price of land or for recovery against the assurance fund.
action for annulment of the cancellation of the award of a lot in favor of plaintiff, which he was prepared to pay for pursuant to an award
an action for the review of an administrative decision involving real property
matter in dispute is a fishpond permit
right to a timber concession
an action to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for the consequent cancellation of a real estate mortgage

Venue for ejectment cases may be changed by written agreement.

The rule on venue does not apply when:
where a specific rule or law provides otherwise
where the parties validly agree on writing before the filing of the action (sec4)

It is fundamental in law governing venue of actions that the situs is fixed to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants by taking to consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the court of justice.

The court may declare the agreement on venue as contrary to public policy if such stipulation unjustly denies a party a fair opportunity to file suit in the place designated by the rules.

Rule 5

Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
(MTC)

All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damage or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney’s fees shall not exceed 20,000.

All other cases where the total amount of claim does not exceed 100,000, or 200,000 in Metro Manila, exclusive of interest and costs.

Allowed pleading (all other pleading are prohibited except motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction):
complaints
compulsory counterclaims
cross-claims
answers thereto

Answer to complaint, counterclaims and cross-claim shall be filed in 10 days after service of summons.

Not later than 30 days, preliminary conference shall be conducted. Failure to appear by plaintiff shall be a cause for the dismissal of action. Defendant who appears in the absence of plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim. All cross-claim shall be dismissed.

Rule 6

Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (sec1a)

Complaint- Answer- Reply

Complaint- is the pleading alleging the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action

Answer- is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses.

Defenses

Negative defense- is the specific denial of material fact/s alleged in the complaint essential to his cause/s of action.
Affirmative Defense- is an allegation of a new matter which while hypothetically admitting the material allegations would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. Ex. Fraud, statute of limitation, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, fromer recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.

Counterclaim- is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.

Compulsory counterclaim (recoupment) is one which arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing parties claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of the third party of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

Compulsory counterclaim is allowed regardless of the amount involved therein.

Permissive counterclaim (set-off) does not arise out nor it is necessary connected with the subject-matter of the opposing party’s claim.

Even the counterclaim arises out of the subject matter but not within the jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, it is only considered permissive counterclaim and is not barred even if not set up in the action

Where the counterclaim or cross-claim has already existed at the time the defendant filed an answer but was not set up through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice so requires, the same may be set up by filing an amended complaints.

Counterclaim or cross-claim maybe answered within 10 days.

Cross-claim- is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.

Reply- is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue to such new matters.
Third (etc)-party complaint- is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect with his opponent’s claim.

Rule 7

Parts of Pleading
caption
the body
2.a paragraphs
2.b heading
2.c relief
2.d date
Signature and address
verification
certification of non-forum shopping

Commercial Law: Insurance Law: Insurable Interest

Insurable interest exists when a person has such a relationship or connection with, or concern in, it that he will derive pecuniary benefit or advantage from its preservation and will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its destruction, termination, or injury by the happening of the event insured against.