Civil Law: Torts and Damages
Art. 694 A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or any thing else which:
1. injures or endangers the health or safety of others;or
2. annoys or offends the senses; or
3. shocks, defies or disregard decency or morality; or
4. obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
5. hinders or impairs the use of property
Nuisance: Lt. nocumentum or Fr. nuire (to harm, hurt, or injure)
Easement Against Nuisance
Art. 682 Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing any nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water, glare, and other causes.
Who is the servient in an easement against nuisance?
Ans: The proprietor or possessor of the building or property, who commits the nuisance. The property or the land itself is the servient estate.
Who is the dominant in an easement against nuisance?
Ans: The general public, or anybody injured by the nuisance.
What are the rights of dominant estate?
Ans: If public nuisance:
a. prosecution under RPC or any local ordinance
b. a civil action
c. abatement, without judicial proceedings
If private nuisance:
a. civil action
b. abatement without judicial proceedings
While a true easement prohibits the owner from that which he could lawfully do where it not for the existence of the easement, a nuisance is something that is done or allowed unlawfully, whether or not a person has made a notarial prohibition.
Art. 683 Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may be maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.
Art. 2191 Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
a. by the explosion of the machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
b. by excessive smoke, which may be harmful to property to persons or property;
c. by the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
d. by emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.
Types of nuisance: accdg. Civil Code
Public (common)- affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons (although the extent of annoyance, danger, or damage be unequal) Criminal proceeding may be used for abatement
- noisy of dangerous factory in a residential district
Private – that which is not public. Criminal proceeding is not a remedy.
- an illegally constructed dam partially resting on another’s estate.
Accdg. to manner of relief
1. those abatable by criminal and civil action
2. those abatable by only civil actions
3. those abatable judicially
4. those abatable extrajudicially
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Case no. Six to Twelve
Civil Law: Law on Sales
FilOil Marketing vs. IAC
Pabalan sold a parcel of land to Villa Rey Transit. On the day of the sale, the TCT was delivered by Pabalan to Villarama, president of Villa Rey, who caused the issuance of the new title in his own name. The transfer appeared to be a deed of sale.
On the same day Villarama mortgaged the lot in behalf of Villa Rey to FilOil as security for a loan. Having defaulted the payment, the lot was extrajudicially foreclosed in which FilOil won the bidding. However before FilOil could consolidate the ownership, Pabalan filed a complaint against Villarama, Villa Rey and FilOil.
The complaint alleged that the sale was conditional and did not transfer the title to the buyer until full payment of the price. RTC and CA both rendered a judgment in favor of complainant.
SC: It is obvious that the instrument is not a contract to sell as contended by Pabalan. It is a deed of sale in which the title was transferred to the vendee as of the date of the transaction notwithstanding that the purchase price had not been fully paid at that time.
In stipulation, it is recognized that the vendee may sell the property prior to full payment of all the amount.
Villarama acted in bad faith when he secured the cancellation of vendor’s title and replaced it in his own name. Pabalan left the drafting of the deed of sale to Villarama whom she trusted. This circumstance alone imposed to Villarama the moral if not the legal responsibility to explain the meaning and consequence of the contract she was signing.
FilOil also acted in bad faith in accepting the property as security to the loan without exercising more vigilance in inquiring with Pabalan, as lessor, into the antecedent of the transfer of title to Villarama.
Servicewide Specialist vs. IAC
Siton purchased from Car Traders Phil. a Mitsubishi Celeste. He paid the 25T downpayment and executed a PN expressly stipulating that the remaining obligation shall be payable without the need of notice of demand. He also executed a chattel mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Car Trader.
The PN and credit was first assigned by Car Trader in favor of Filinvest Credit Corp. which the latter assigned the same to Servicewide Specialist. Siton was advised of the reassignment.
Alleging Siton failed to pay the installment , Servicewide instituted the present action against Siton and John Doe. De Dumo appeared as John Doe alleging that he purchased the vehicle to Siton. He averred that he was the one who continued the payment of installment. The trial court ordered Siton and de Dumo to pay jointly and severally the remaining balance. CA affirmed the ruling.
SC: Servicewide alleged that the sale between Siton and De Dumo was void as contrary to the provision of Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The Rule is that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however he is alleged under pain of penal liability to secure the written consent of the mortgagee.
We find it correct in holding that Siton and De Dumo is jointly and severally liable to the obligation as there was no implication that the liability of Siton is extinguished when the time he sold the property to De Dumo. The same does not constitute novation.
The acceptance of payment from De Dumo merely results the addition of debtors and not novation.
Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Filriters is the registered owner of a Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness. Under a Deed of Assignment Filriters transferred the CBCI to PhilFinance. Subsequently PhilFinance transferred the CBCI to TRB while the same was still in the name of Filriters. The transfer was made under a repurchase agreement granting PhilFinance the right to repurchase the instrument note. When PhilFinance failed to buy back the note on maturity date, it executed a deed of assignment to TRB all its rights and title.
TRB sought the transfer and registration of CBCI in its name however CB refused to effect the transfer in view of the action filed by Filriters.
Trial court and CA nullified the transfer made between PhilFinance to TRB.
SC: The assignment of certificate from Filriters to PhilFinance was fictitious, having made without consideration and did not conform to bank circular which provides that any assignment of registered certificates shall not be valid unless made by the registered owner thereof in person or by his representative duly authorized in writing.
TRB interest has no basis, since it was derived from PhilFinance, whose interest was inexistent. What happened is that PhilFinance merely borrowed CBCI from Filriters, a sister corporation, to guarantee its financing operations. Therefore the transfer of certificate from PhilFinance to TRB is complete nullity.
Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie
A property of the Intestate Estate of Reynoso was leased to Bonnevie by the administratrix for a period of 1 year with stipulation that if ever the property shall be sold, the lessees shall be given a first priority to purchase the same, all things and consideration being equal.
According to administratrix she notified Bonnevie by registered mail that she was selling the property however Bonnevie never replied to the notice. The same was offered and sold to petitioner. The administratrix send a letter to Bonnevie to vacate the premises but the latter refused.
An action for ejectment was filed which resulted to a compromise agreement; Bonnevie shall vacate the premises. Bonnevie did not comply hence a motion for execution was filed. While the case was pending, Bonnevie filed an action to annul the contract of sale to Guzman and the cancellation of the title. Bonnevie asked the court to require the seller to sell the property to him under the same terms and condition.
The ejectment case was dismissed and when it was appealed the same was consolidated with the other civil case of annulment of sale. CFI rendered a judgment in favor of Bonnevie. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: There was no satisfactory proof that the letter was sent to Bonnevie; that administratrix never showed the registry return card.
Even if the letter had been sent to and received by Bonnevie and they did not exercise their right of first priority, the administrator would still be guilty of violating the contract of lease which stated that Bonnevie could exercise, ‘all things and conditions being equal’.
The fact that Bonnevie had financial problems at that time was no justification for denying them the first option to buy the property. And even Bonnevie could not buy the property, the administrator could not sell the property to another for a lower price and under more favorable terms and conditions.
Guzman & Co. could not be deemed a purchaser in good faith for the record shows that it categorically admitted it was aware of the lease in favor of Bonnevie, who were actually occupying the property.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice or claim of the interest of some other person in property.
Petition is DENIED.
Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
NDC, during 60s, leased its property in Sta. Mesa to Firestone for ten years renewable for another 10 years with the same conditions. The contract was renewed several times and the latest of which contains stipulation that should the lessor decides to sell the property, priority should be given to the lessee.
When the contract was about to expire Firestone expressed its desire to renew the contract. NDC promised for the renewal. Firestone’s predicament worsen when rumors of NDC’s supposed plan to dispose the property in favor of PUP came to its knowledge. Firestone sent notice to NDC conveying its desire to purchase the property in exercise of its contractual right of first refusal.
Firestone filed an action for specific performance to compel NDC to sell the leased premises. It averred it is pre-empting the sale of the property to PUP. PUP intervened.
The trial court ordered the sale of the property to Firestone. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: It is elementary that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal that stands upon valuable consideration.
A contract of sale is a contract where one of the parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing to the other who shall pay therefore a sum certain in money or its equivalent.
The inherent weakness of the NDC’s proposition that there was no sale as it was only government which was involved in the transaction. A GOCC has a personality of its own distict and separate from the government.
The right of first refusal is an integral and indivisible part of the contract of lease and is inseparable to the whole contract. The consideration for the rightis built into the reciprocal obligations of the parties. Thus it is not correct for the petitioner to insist that there wasno consideration paid by Firestone to be entitled of such right.
Petition is DENIED.
Rosencor Development Corporation vs. Inquing
Respondents were lessees since 1971 of a property owned by Tiangco. The agreement was made orally with stipulation that the lessees were given the right to purchase the property if they decide to sell the same.
Upon the death of Tiangco, the heirs took over the property and the lease contract continued with the same stipulation. Respondents made improvements on the property which were not deducted to rents.
A certain Atty. Aguila sent a notice to vacate the premises addressed to respondents but the latter refused. Thereafter the heir offered to sell the property to respondents for 2M, however the latter offered to buy the same for only 1M.
Later on, respondents again received a letter from Atty. Aguila that the property was already sold to Rosencor. It was further known that the price was only for 726000. Respondent offered to reimburse the selling price but the same was refused. Respondents filed the instant action for rescission of the Deed of Sale between heirs (De Leon) and Rosencor.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It said that the right to redemption was made orally therefore unenforceable. The CA reversed the ruling.
SC: Is the right of first refusal covered by the Statute of Fraud? The term is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The statute does not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.
The right of first refusal is not among the listed as unenforceable under the statutes of frauds. As such a right of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable and may be proven by oral evidence.
We agree with the CA that the respondents have sufficiently proven the existence of first refusal. It must also be noted that the petitioner did not present evidence to contradict such existence during trial.
May a contract of sale entered into in violation of third party’s right of first refusal be rescinded in order that such third party can exercise said right? In the prevailing doctrine, the contract of sale entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible. There is however, a circumstance which prevents the application of this doctrine in the case at bench. The vendees in this case have proven that it had acted in bad faith for the doctrine to be applicable.
This Court did not find that Rosencor acted in bad faith in the purchase of the property. CA decision is REVERSED.
State Investment House vs. Court of Appeals
Solid Homes entered in a Contract to Sell with Oreta involving a parcel of land in Capitol Park Subd. Solid Homes executed several real estate mortgage contracts in favor of State Investment Homes over its subdivided parcels of land including the property sold to Oreta..
Upon failure to pay, State Investment extrajudicially foreclosed the property including the disputed title.
Oreta filed a complaint before the HLURB against State and Solid Homes for failure of Solid Homes to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale. The Office of Legal, Adjudication and Legal Affairs rendered a decision in favor of Oreta ordering the delivery of title to the latter. HLURB affirmed the ruling.
When it was brought up to SC, the latter referred the case to CA which decided affirming the decision.
SC: We note that herein petitioner admits the superior rights of respondent over the subject property as it did not pray for the nullification of the contract between Solid and Oreta, but instead asked the payment of the release value of the property in question. And even if we were to pass upon the first assigned error, we find the respondent court’s ruling on the matter to be well founded. State’s registered mortgaged right over the property is inferior to that of Oreta’s unregistered right.
The unrecorded sale between Solid and Oreta is preferred for the reason that if the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it again. The decision is AFFIRMED.
FilOil Marketing vs. IAC
Pabalan sold a parcel of land to Villa Rey Transit. On the day of the sale, the TCT was delivered by Pabalan to Villarama, president of Villa Rey, who caused the issuance of the new title in his own name. The transfer appeared to be a deed of sale.
On the same day Villarama mortgaged the lot in behalf of Villa Rey to FilOil as security for a loan. Having defaulted the payment, the lot was extrajudicially foreclosed in which FilOil won the bidding. However before FilOil could consolidate the ownership, Pabalan filed a complaint against Villarama, Villa Rey and FilOil.
The complaint alleged that the sale was conditional and did not transfer the title to the buyer until full payment of the price. RTC and CA both rendered a judgment in favor of complainant.
SC: It is obvious that the instrument is not a contract to sell as contended by Pabalan. It is a deed of sale in which the title was transferred to the vendee as of the date of the transaction notwithstanding that the purchase price had not been fully paid at that time.
In stipulation, it is recognized that the vendee may sell the property prior to full payment of all the amount.
Villarama acted in bad faith when he secured the cancellation of vendor’s title and replaced it in his own name. Pabalan left the drafting of the deed of sale to Villarama whom she trusted. This circumstance alone imposed to Villarama the moral if not the legal responsibility to explain the meaning and consequence of the contract she was signing.
FilOil also acted in bad faith in accepting the property as security to the loan without exercising more vigilance in inquiring with Pabalan, as lessor, into the antecedent of the transfer of title to Villarama.
Servicewide Specialist vs. IAC
Siton purchased from Car Traders Phil. a Mitsubishi Celeste. He paid the 25T downpayment and executed a PN expressly stipulating that the remaining obligation shall be payable without the need of notice of demand. He also executed a chattel mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Car Trader.
The PN and credit was first assigned by Car Trader in favor of Filinvest Credit Corp. which the latter assigned the same to Servicewide Specialist. Siton was advised of the reassignment.
Alleging Siton failed to pay the installment , Servicewide instituted the present action against Siton and John Doe. De Dumo appeared as John Doe alleging that he purchased the vehicle to Siton. He averred that he was the one who continued the payment of installment. The trial court ordered Siton and de Dumo to pay jointly and severally the remaining balance. CA affirmed the ruling.
SC: Servicewide alleged that the sale between Siton and De Dumo was void as contrary to the provision of Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The Rule is that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the owner of the property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however he is alleged under pain of penal liability to secure the written consent of the mortgagee.
We find it correct in holding that Siton and De Dumo is jointly and severally liable to the obligation as there was no implication that the liability of Siton is extinguished when the time he sold the property to De Dumo. The same does not constitute novation.
The acceptance of payment from De Dumo merely results the addition of debtors and not novation.
Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Filriters is the registered owner of a Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness. Under a Deed of Assignment Filriters transferred the CBCI to PhilFinance. Subsequently PhilFinance transferred the CBCI to TRB while the same was still in the name of Filriters. The transfer was made under a repurchase agreement granting PhilFinance the right to repurchase the instrument note. When PhilFinance failed to buy back the note on maturity date, it executed a deed of assignment to TRB all its rights and title.
TRB sought the transfer and registration of CBCI in its name however CB refused to effect the transfer in view of the action filed by Filriters.
Trial court and CA nullified the transfer made between PhilFinance to TRB.
SC: The assignment of certificate from Filriters to PhilFinance was fictitious, having made without consideration and did not conform to bank circular which provides that any assignment of registered certificates shall not be valid unless made by the registered owner thereof in person or by his representative duly authorized in writing.
TRB interest has no basis, since it was derived from PhilFinance, whose interest was inexistent. What happened is that PhilFinance merely borrowed CBCI from Filriters, a sister corporation, to guarantee its financing operations. Therefore the transfer of certificate from PhilFinance to TRB is complete nullity.
Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie
A property of the Intestate Estate of Reynoso was leased to Bonnevie by the administratrix for a period of 1 year with stipulation that if ever the property shall be sold, the lessees shall be given a first priority to purchase the same, all things and consideration being equal.
According to administratrix she notified Bonnevie by registered mail that she was selling the property however Bonnevie never replied to the notice. The same was offered and sold to petitioner. The administratrix send a letter to Bonnevie to vacate the premises but the latter refused.
An action for ejectment was filed which resulted to a compromise agreement; Bonnevie shall vacate the premises. Bonnevie did not comply hence a motion for execution was filed. While the case was pending, Bonnevie filed an action to annul the contract of sale to Guzman and the cancellation of the title. Bonnevie asked the court to require the seller to sell the property to him under the same terms and condition.
The ejectment case was dismissed and when it was appealed the same was consolidated with the other civil case of annulment of sale. CFI rendered a judgment in favor of Bonnevie. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: There was no satisfactory proof that the letter was sent to Bonnevie; that administratrix never showed the registry return card.
Even if the letter had been sent to and received by Bonnevie and they did not exercise their right of first priority, the administrator would still be guilty of violating the contract of lease which stated that Bonnevie could exercise, ‘all things and conditions being equal’.
The fact that Bonnevie had financial problems at that time was no justification for denying them the first option to buy the property. And even Bonnevie could not buy the property, the administrator could not sell the property to another for a lower price and under more favorable terms and conditions.
Guzman & Co. could not be deemed a purchaser in good faith for the record shows that it categorically admitted it was aware of the lease in favor of Bonnevie, who were actually occupying the property.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice or claim of the interest of some other person in property.
Petition is DENIED.
Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
NDC, during 60s, leased its property in Sta. Mesa to Firestone for ten years renewable for another 10 years with the same conditions. The contract was renewed several times and the latest of which contains stipulation that should the lessor decides to sell the property, priority should be given to the lessee.
When the contract was about to expire Firestone expressed its desire to renew the contract. NDC promised for the renewal. Firestone’s predicament worsen when rumors of NDC’s supposed plan to dispose the property in favor of PUP came to its knowledge. Firestone sent notice to NDC conveying its desire to purchase the property in exercise of its contractual right of first refusal.
Firestone filed an action for specific performance to compel NDC to sell the leased premises. It averred it is pre-empting the sale of the property to PUP. PUP intervened.
The trial court ordered the sale of the property to Firestone. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: It is elementary that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal that stands upon valuable consideration.
A contract of sale is a contract where one of the parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing to the other who shall pay therefore a sum certain in money or its equivalent.
The inherent weakness of the NDC’s proposition that there was no sale as it was only government which was involved in the transaction. A GOCC has a personality of its own distict and separate from the government.
The right of first refusal is an integral and indivisible part of the contract of lease and is inseparable to the whole contract. The consideration for the rightis built into the reciprocal obligations of the parties. Thus it is not correct for the petitioner to insist that there wasno consideration paid by Firestone to be entitled of such right.
Petition is DENIED.
Rosencor Development Corporation vs. Inquing
Respondents were lessees since 1971 of a property owned by Tiangco. The agreement was made orally with stipulation that the lessees were given the right to purchase the property if they decide to sell the same.
Upon the death of Tiangco, the heirs took over the property and the lease contract continued with the same stipulation. Respondents made improvements on the property which were not deducted to rents.
A certain Atty. Aguila sent a notice to vacate the premises addressed to respondents but the latter refused. Thereafter the heir offered to sell the property to respondents for 2M, however the latter offered to buy the same for only 1M.
Later on, respondents again received a letter from Atty. Aguila that the property was already sold to Rosencor. It was further known that the price was only for 726000. Respondent offered to reimburse the selling price but the same was refused. Respondents filed the instant action for rescission of the Deed of Sale between heirs (De Leon) and Rosencor.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It said that the right to redemption was made orally therefore unenforceable. The CA reversed the ruling.
SC: Is the right of first refusal covered by the Statute of Fraud? The term is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The statute does not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.
The right of first refusal is not among the listed as unenforceable under the statutes of frauds. As such a right of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable and may be proven by oral evidence.
We agree with the CA that the respondents have sufficiently proven the existence of first refusal. It must also be noted that the petitioner did not present evidence to contradict such existence during trial.
May a contract of sale entered into in violation of third party’s right of first refusal be rescinded in order that such third party can exercise said right? In the prevailing doctrine, the contract of sale entered into in violation of a right of first refusal of another person, while valid, is rescissible. There is however, a circumstance which prevents the application of this doctrine in the case at bench. The vendees in this case have proven that it had acted in bad faith for the doctrine to be applicable.
This Court did not find that Rosencor acted in bad faith in the purchase of the property. CA decision is REVERSED.
State Investment House vs. Court of Appeals
Solid Homes entered in a Contract to Sell with Oreta involving a parcel of land in Capitol Park Subd. Solid Homes executed several real estate mortgage contracts in favor of State Investment Homes over its subdivided parcels of land including the property sold to Oreta..
Upon failure to pay, State Investment extrajudicially foreclosed the property including the disputed title.
Oreta filed a complaint before the HLURB against State and Solid Homes for failure of Solid Homes to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale. The Office of Legal, Adjudication and Legal Affairs rendered a decision in favor of Oreta ordering the delivery of title to the latter. HLURB affirmed the ruling.
When it was brought up to SC, the latter referred the case to CA which decided affirming the decision.
SC: We note that herein petitioner admits the superior rights of respondent over the subject property as it did not pray for the nullification of the contract between Solid and Oreta, but instead asked the payment of the release value of the property in question. And even if we were to pass upon the first assigned error, we find the respondent court’s ruling on the matter to be well founded. State’s registered mortgaged right over the property is inferior to that of Oreta’s unregistered right.
The unrecorded sale between Solid and Oreta is preferred for the reason that if the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it again. The decision is AFFIRMED.
Monday, June 22, 2009
First Five Case Digests
Civil Law: Law on Sales
Dignos vs. Court of Appeals
Dignos owned a lot which was sold to Jabil on June 1965 payable in two installment with an assumption of indebtedness with First Insular Bank in the sum of 12000 which was paid to Digno and the next installment to be payed on September of the same year.
On November 1965, Dignos sold the same property to Cabigas. A deed of sale was executed and registered with the Register of Deed.
As Dignos refused the payment of second installment from Jabil, and after the knowledge by the latter of the sale to Cabigas, Jabil filed the instant case.
CFI Cebu rendered a decision voiding the sale of Dignos to Cabigas and awarding the sale to Jabil. CA affirmed the decision.
SC: Dignos reiterated that the sale is conditional and not absolute, such the same is subject to suspensive condition of payment in two installment.
A sale is absolute although denominated as contract of conditional sale where no where in the contract is a stipulation to effect that the title of the property is reserved to vendor until full payment, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon non-fulfillment of obligation. The present case presents the same situation.
Valid elements of the contract of sale: 1. consent or meetings of the mind, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money or its equivalent.
Dignos claimed that when they sold the property to Cabigas the previous contract has been already rescinded. It is undisputed that Dignos never notified Jabil of the rescission nor they filed in court an action to rescind such. SC AFFIRMED in toto the CA decision.
Nool vs. Court of Appeals
Conchita Nool owned a lot which was mortgaged to DBP when she secured a loan. Upon non-payment of loan it was foreclosed by DBP. Within the time of redemption Conchita contacted Anacleto Nool to redeem the foreclosed property which the latter did. The titles were transferred to Anacleto but it was agreed that Conchita can get back the property soon when she has money. Conchita asked the Anacleto for the return of the property but the latter refused even after the intervention of the barangay. The case was filed.
Anacleto theorized that the lands were acquired by them from DBP through negotiated sale. He argued that he was made to believe that the property was still owned by Conchita when they agreed of redemption.
RTC said it was DBP who was the owner of the property when the sale to Anacleto was made. DBP became the absolute owner of the property after the redemption period of the foreclosed property had lapsed. RTC denied the action by Conchita. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: The contract of repurchase entered by Conchita and Anacleto was void there being no subject to speak of. It is clear that Conchita was no longer the owner of the property when such agreement was made with Anacleto. It is likewise clear that the seller can no longer deliver the object of the sale to the buyer, as the buyer had already acquired the title from the rightful owner. Jurisprudence teaches us that a person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell ; the buyer can acquire no more that what the seller can legally transfer.
The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. CA is decision AFFIRMED. Petition is DENIED.
People’s Homesite vs. Court of Appeals
People’s Homesite (PHHC) passéd a resolution subject to the approval of the city council of the Lot 4 as it is hereby awarded to Mendoza. The city council disapproved the proposal. The Mendozas were notified through registered mail. Another subdivision plan was passed and was approved by the city council. PHHC passed a resolution recalling all awards to persons who failed to pay the agreed downpayment. Mendoza never paid the down payment. The questioned award of lot was withdrawn and was re-awarded to other 5 persons. Mendoza asked for reconsideration but before it was acted, He instituted the action.
Trial court sustained the withdrawal while the CA reversed the decision.
SC: There was no perfect sale of Lot 4 to Mendoza. It was conditionally awarded to Mendoza subject to city council’s approval which was disapproved. When after the city council approved such, Mendoza should have manifested his intention over the said award but he did not so.
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the mind upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. In conditional obligation, the acquisition of rkights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitute the condition. In this case, there was no meeting of the minds.
Heirs of Juan San Andres vs. Rodriguez
Juan San Andres sold a portion of his property to Rodriguez as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Upon his death Ramon San Andres was appointed as administrator of the property. He hired a land surveyor and found that Rodriguez enlarged the property he bought from late Juan. Ramon demanded form the Rodriguez to vacate the portion allegedly occupied but the latter refused hence the present action.
Rodriguez said that the excess portion was also sold to him by late Juan the following day after the first sale. He argued that the full payment of the whole sold lot would be effected within five years from the execution of the formal deed of sale after a survey of the property is conducted, as evidenced by a receipt of sale. The balance of the purchase price was consigned.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner while CA reversed the ruling. In SC petitioner argued that there is no certain object of the contract of sale as the lot was not described with sufficiency that there should be another contract to finally ascertain the identity.
SC: Petition has no merit. The contract of sale has the following elements: 1. consent or meeting of the minds, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money.
There is no dispute that Rodriguez purchased a potion of Lot 1914-B consisting of 345 square meters. The said portion is located at the middle of the lot. Since the lot subsequently sold is said to adjoined the previously paid lot, the subject is capable of being determined without the need of another contract.
However, there is a need to clarify what CA said is a conditional sale. CA considered as a condition the stipulation of the parties that the full consideration, based on a survey of the lot, would be due and payable within 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale.
It is evident in the stipulation in the receipt that the vendor late Juan sold the lot to Rodriguez and undertook the transfer of ownership without any qualification, reservation or condition.
In can be gainsaid from the facts that the contract of sale is absolute, and not conditional. There is no reservation of ownership nor stipulation providing for a unilateral rescission by either party. In fact the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to Rodriguez. Art.1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive deliver thereof.
The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale is not a condition which affects the efficacy of contract.
CA decision is AFFIIRMED.
Galang vs. Court of Appeals
Buenaventuras sold to Galangs the property they inherited from their parents. The agreement was embodied in the Deed of Sale. The agreements as to payment were as follows: 25% of the purchase price is to be paid upon the signing, 25% within 3 months or upon the removal of encargo from the premises, with the delivery of the owner’s duplicate certificate, 50% is within 1 year upon which the title will be transferred. Galangs paid the first 25% of the price. Thereafter they demanded the removal of the encargo and the delivery of the duplicate title. Buenaventuras failed to do so despite the willingness of Galangs to pay the other 25%. Galangs filed the instant action for specific performance.
The trial court rescinded the contract despite the prayer of Galang for specific performance. It ruled that impossible condition, those contrary to good custom or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. Since the consummation of sale is dependent upon the ouster of agricultural lessees which cannot be done because it is against good custom, public policy and the law, the sale is a nullity. CA affirmed the ruling.
SC: We disagree with the conclusion of the two lower courts. Reviewing the terms of the Deed of Sale, it is clear that the parties had reached the stage of perfection of the contract of sale.
The alleged condition precedent, the removal of the encargo, was simply an alternative for payment of another 25% of the purchase price given by the seller. Assuming that the removal of encargo could not be brought about by the buyer, petitioner could have demanded the duplicate of the owners certificate of title by paying 25% of the sale price within 3 months.
The case before us could have been resolved by the lower court without ruling on the whether the encargo was a tenant or not. Granting that it was necessary to rule on the status of the encargo, we find that the courts had been quite precipitate in holding that the encargi was a tenant. Petition is GRANTED.
Dignos vs. Court of Appeals
Dignos owned a lot which was sold to Jabil on June 1965 payable in two installment with an assumption of indebtedness with First Insular Bank in the sum of 12000 which was paid to Digno and the next installment to be payed on September of the same year.
On November 1965, Dignos sold the same property to Cabigas. A deed of sale was executed and registered with the Register of Deed.
As Dignos refused the payment of second installment from Jabil, and after the knowledge by the latter of the sale to Cabigas, Jabil filed the instant case.
CFI Cebu rendered a decision voiding the sale of Dignos to Cabigas and awarding the sale to Jabil. CA affirmed the decision.
SC: Dignos reiterated that the sale is conditional and not absolute, such the same is subject to suspensive condition of payment in two installment.
A sale is absolute although denominated as contract of conditional sale where no where in the contract is a stipulation to effect that the title of the property is reserved to vendor until full payment, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon non-fulfillment of obligation. The present case presents the same situation.
Valid elements of the contract of sale: 1. consent or meetings of the mind, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money or its equivalent.
Dignos claimed that when they sold the property to Cabigas the previous contract has been already rescinded. It is undisputed that Dignos never notified Jabil of the rescission nor they filed in court an action to rescind such. SC AFFIRMED in toto the CA decision.
Nool vs. Court of Appeals
Conchita Nool owned a lot which was mortgaged to DBP when she secured a loan. Upon non-payment of loan it was foreclosed by DBP. Within the time of redemption Conchita contacted Anacleto Nool to redeem the foreclosed property which the latter did. The titles were transferred to Anacleto but it was agreed that Conchita can get back the property soon when she has money. Conchita asked the Anacleto for the return of the property but the latter refused even after the intervention of the barangay. The case was filed.
Anacleto theorized that the lands were acquired by them from DBP through negotiated sale. He argued that he was made to believe that the property was still owned by Conchita when they agreed of redemption.
RTC said it was DBP who was the owner of the property when the sale to Anacleto was made. DBP became the absolute owner of the property after the redemption period of the foreclosed property had lapsed. RTC denied the action by Conchita. It was affirmed by CA.
SC: The contract of repurchase entered by Conchita and Anacleto was void there being no subject to speak of. It is clear that Conchita was no longer the owner of the property when such agreement was made with Anacleto. It is likewise clear that the seller can no longer deliver the object of the sale to the buyer, as the buyer had already acquired the title from the rightful owner. Jurisprudence teaches us that a person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell ; the buyer can acquire no more that what the seller can legally transfer.
The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. CA is decision AFFIRMED. Petition is DENIED.
People’s Homesite vs. Court of Appeals
People’s Homesite (PHHC) passéd a resolution subject to the approval of the city council of the Lot 4 as it is hereby awarded to Mendoza. The city council disapproved the proposal. The Mendozas were notified through registered mail. Another subdivision plan was passed and was approved by the city council. PHHC passed a resolution recalling all awards to persons who failed to pay the agreed downpayment. Mendoza never paid the down payment. The questioned award of lot was withdrawn and was re-awarded to other 5 persons. Mendoza asked for reconsideration but before it was acted, He instituted the action.
Trial court sustained the withdrawal while the CA reversed the decision.
SC: There was no perfect sale of Lot 4 to Mendoza. It was conditionally awarded to Mendoza subject to city council’s approval which was disapproved. When after the city council approved such, Mendoza should have manifested his intention over the said award but he did not so.
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the mind upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. In conditional obligation, the acquisition of rkights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitute the condition. In this case, there was no meeting of the minds.
Heirs of Juan San Andres vs. Rodriguez
Juan San Andres sold a portion of his property to Rodriguez as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Upon his death Ramon San Andres was appointed as administrator of the property. He hired a land surveyor and found that Rodriguez enlarged the property he bought from late Juan. Ramon demanded form the Rodriguez to vacate the portion allegedly occupied but the latter refused hence the present action.
Rodriguez said that the excess portion was also sold to him by late Juan the following day after the first sale. He argued that the full payment of the whole sold lot would be effected within five years from the execution of the formal deed of sale after a survey of the property is conducted, as evidenced by a receipt of sale. The balance of the purchase price was consigned.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner while CA reversed the ruling. In SC petitioner argued that there is no certain object of the contract of sale as the lot was not described with sufficiency that there should be another contract to finally ascertain the identity.
SC: Petition has no merit. The contract of sale has the following elements: 1. consent or meeting of the minds, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money.
There is no dispute that Rodriguez purchased a potion of Lot 1914-B consisting of 345 square meters. The said portion is located at the middle of the lot. Since the lot subsequently sold is said to adjoined the previously paid lot, the subject is capable of being determined without the need of another contract.
However, there is a need to clarify what CA said is a conditional sale. CA considered as a condition the stipulation of the parties that the full consideration, based on a survey of the lot, would be due and payable within 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale.
It is evident in the stipulation in the receipt that the vendor late Juan sold the lot to Rodriguez and undertook the transfer of ownership without any qualification, reservation or condition.
In can be gainsaid from the facts that the contract of sale is absolute, and not conditional. There is no reservation of ownership nor stipulation providing for a unilateral rescission by either party. In fact the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to Rodriguez. Art.1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive deliver thereof.
The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale is not a condition which affects the efficacy of contract.
CA decision is AFFIIRMED.
Galang vs. Court of Appeals
Buenaventuras sold to Galangs the property they inherited from their parents. The agreement was embodied in the Deed of Sale. The agreements as to payment were as follows: 25% of the purchase price is to be paid upon the signing, 25% within 3 months or upon the removal of encargo from the premises, with the delivery of the owner’s duplicate certificate, 50% is within 1 year upon which the title will be transferred. Galangs paid the first 25% of the price. Thereafter they demanded the removal of the encargo and the delivery of the duplicate title. Buenaventuras failed to do so despite the willingness of Galangs to pay the other 25%. Galangs filed the instant action for specific performance.
The trial court rescinded the contract despite the prayer of Galang for specific performance. It ruled that impossible condition, those contrary to good custom or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. Since the consummation of sale is dependent upon the ouster of agricultural lessees which cannot be done because it is against good custom, public policy and the law, the sale is a nullity. CA affirmed the ruling.
SC: We disagree with the conclusion of the two lower courts. Reviewing the terms of the Deed of Sale, it is clear that the parties had reached the stage of perfection of the contract of sale.
The alleged condition precedent, the removal of the encargo, was simply an alternative for payment of another 25% of the purchase price given by the seller. Assuming that the removal of encargo could not be brought about by the buyer, petitioner could have demanded the duplicate of the owners certificate of title by paying 25% of the sale price within 3 months.
The case before us could have been resolved by the lower court without ruling on the whether the encargo was a tenant or not. Granting that it was necessary to rule on the status of the encargo, we find that the courts had been quite precipitate in holding that the encargi was a tenant. Petition is GRANTED.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
